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Supervision is crucial to most forms of talking therapy. This article focuses
on psychoanalysis and explores how supervision can be conceptualized
from a Lacanian point of view. We discuss two principal ideas about
supervision from Lacan’s work: making the analyst sensitive to the sym-
bolic component of the unconscious and becoming sensitive to the interre-
lation between language and jouissance. These ideas comprise two stages
that Lacan discerned in the process of supervision: the ‘stage of the rhino’
and the ‘stage of the pun’. We illustrate Lacan’s distinction between these
stages by means of vignettes of analysts who were supervised by Lacan.
We argue that an additional third stage should be discerned, concerning
the challenge of incarnating the position of the so-called object a. Last, we
discuss the pitfalls that an analyst might experience when conducting and
directing the analytic work, namely the consistency of the imaginary, the
delusion of the symbolic and the real of the body.
KEYWORDS: LACAN, SUPERVISION, SUPERAUDITION,
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY, LANGUAGE
INTRODUCTION
Supervision is crucial to most forms of talking therapy. It is a platform to support
the therapist and to critically reflect on his or her practice. For many, it is a central
component of clinical training (e.g. Rainbow Report, 1955), a part of good practice
and professional development (e.g. Fleming & Steen, 2004a), and a prerequisite for
the practice of psychotherapy (e.g. Roth & Fonagy, 1996; Corrie & Lane, 2015;
Barnett & Molzon, 2014). Not only is supervision correlated with more effective
therapy, it also increases job satisfaction and lowers instances of burnout (Falender,
Shafranske & Ofek, 2014).
In this paper, we discuss supervision from a Lacanian perspective as research on
this topic seems scarce, or isn’t mentioned at all (Ellis et al., 1996; Zaslavsky,
Nunes & Eizirik, 2005; Ogden, 2005; Rubinstein, 2007). How supervision is
addressed in other psychoanalytic traditions is not the focus of this paper.
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Although for Lacan, supervision was an important practice (‘A psychoanalyst
authorizes himself, only by himself … and some others’; Lacan, 2001 [1967],
p. 243), he did not formalize or institutionalize it; nor did he formulate a systematic
theory about it (André 2014; Gorog, 1992). He referred to it in only disparate parts
of his work. Nonetheless, as supervision is an important part of the training process,
it should be framed theoretically (Langs, 1994). As suggested by Kilminster and
Folly (2000), the practice of supervision should be rooted in a sound conceptual
basis, define its guiding principles in detail and use a coherent theoretical rationale.
In this paper, we aim to analyse how Lacan and Lacanian psychoanalysts conceptu-
alize supervision and clear the way for further clinical research.
The Lacanian approach to supervision has an interesting function. The main focus of
supervision here is to help the analyst become more sensitive to the process of the ana-
lytic work with the analysant,1 grasp the logic of the analysant’s functioning, and
enhance the supervisee’s capacity for reflection. As Lacan never institutionalized super-
vision, it does not serve a ‘gatekeeping’ function for trainee analysts (Fleming & Steen,
2004a), nor does it purport to evaluate or steer their practice. Moreover, contrary to
what is often the case (see Grotjahn, 1955; Keiser, 1956; Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1958;
Zaslavsky, Nunes & Eizirik, 2005; Wagner, 1957), Lacanian supervision is not thera-
pist centred and therefore the unconscious and the countertransference of the supervisee
are not at stake. Nor is Lacanian supervision patient centred, and therefore issues of
diagnosis and technique tend to have only a secondary importance.
In this paper, we discuss two principal ideas about supervision from Lacan’s
work. First, we look at ‘The function and field of speech and language in psycho-
analysis’ (Lacan 1966 [1953]), which focuses on making the analyst more sensitive
to the symbolic component of the unconscious. Second, building on Lacan’s later
teaching and his novel concepts of ‘Llanguage’ (lalangue), we consider supervision
as a matter of making the analyst more sensitive to the interrelation between lan-
guage and jouissance.
These ideas comprise two so-called stages that Lacan discerned in the process of
supervision: the ‘stage of the rhino’ and the ‘stage of the pun’. We discuss Lacan’s dis-
tinction between these stages by means of vignettes of analysts who were supervised
by Lacan. However, in line with Jonckheere (2000) we argue that Lacan’s two-staged
model is somewhat limited, and that a third stage needs to be discerned as well, which
concerns the challenge of incarnating the position of the so-called object a.
Finally, we discuss the resistances and pitfalls that an analyst might experience in
the analytic work. In line with Lacan’s distinction between the registers of the sym-
bolic, the imaginary and the real at the basis of mental functioning, we call these ‘the
consistency of the imaginary’, ‘the delusion of the symbolic’ and ‘the real of the body’.
LACAN AND SUPERVISION
To grasp Lacan’s approach to supervision, two main references are crucial: his
paper ‘The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis’ (Lacan,
1966 [1953]); and the first session of his seminar on the Sinthome (Lacan, 2005
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[1975–76]). In both texts, which cover elements of his early and later teaching
respectively, Lacan formulates ideas about supervision, cohering with his broader
theory on the nature of the psychoanalytic process at that time.
Supervision in ‘The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis’
‘Making the analyst more sensitive to the symbolic component of the unconscious’
In ‘The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis’, Lacan (1966
[1953]) develops ideas about the psychoanalytic process via a critique on classical
post-Freudian theories (Jonckheere, 2000). For Lacan, the analyst does not have to
focus on the patient’s actions in real life, but on the unconscious logic underlying
them. In this context, for example, he discusses the case of Ernst Kris, who investi-
gated whether one of his patients was guilty of the plagiarism that he had obsession-
ally accused himself of during the treatment. The patient was a young academic
who became obsessed with the idea that he was guilty of plagiarism. During the
treatment, Kris investigated this, and confronted him with the conclusion that his
work did not constitute plagiarism.
Lacan indicates that by focusing on the reality of the patient, Kris did not relieve
the patient of his difficulty with procrastination (about publishing of his own aca-
demic work) and even provoked acting out: ‘attention should not aim at an object
beyond the subject’s speech the way it does for certain analysts who force them-
selves to never lose sight of that object’ (Lacan, 1966 [1953], p. 210). Lacan sug-
gests that one should focus on speech and signifiers, since it is by reading them that
the repressed can be found. Accordingly, a patient consulting a therapist should not
be told what is wrong in relation to how he behaves or reacts to stimuli, but should
be given the opportunity to speak, such that the unconscious logic around his behav-
iour can appear (De Kesel, 2017). Therefore, in Lacanian analysis, the analyst
should not focus on feelings, behaviours or introspection, but on ‘full speech’
(i.e. on subtle expressions of unconscious truth), and create a space where the
patient can freely explore unexpected elements that come to the fore in speech about
symptoms, dreams etc., thus revealing himself as a desiring subject.
Likewise, Lacan (1966 [1953]) indicates that the focus of supervision is ‘the
unconscious as structured like a language’ and the idea that we can only grasp the
unconscious by exploring discontinuities in the patient’s narrative. As an analyst,
one can be blinded by the day-to-day relationship with the analysant, which func-
tions as an imaginary mirror in which we recognize the other and ourselves. This
might make us believe that we understand what he/she is saying, and become deaf
to the inconsistencies that the patient defends himself against (Fink, 2007). As such,
it becomes impossible for the analyst to hear the unconscious logic in a person’s
speech. Supervision aims to open the analyst up to the symbolic dimension of
speech (i.e. to ambiguities and unexpected connotations). The purpose of supervi-
sion is to offer a ‘second hearing’, or a third point in the relation between analyst
and the analysant. This prevents the analyst from being absorbed by the day-to-day
reality of the analysant’s narrative:
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The supervisee serves as a filter, or even as a refractor, of the subject’s dis-
course, and in this way a ready-made stereography is presented to the supervi-
sor, bringing out from the start the three or four registers on which the
musical score constituted by the subject’s discourse can be read. (Lacan, 1966
[1953], p. 210)
Along this way, the supervisee will learn to listen differently, focusing on the
unconscious symbolic logic in the analysant’s speech:
The greatest benefit he would derive from this exercise would be to learn to
put himself in the position of that second subjectivity into which the situation
automatically puts the supervisor. (Lacan, 1966 [1953], p. 210)
This idea of a ‘second subjectivity’ also appears in Lacan’s analysis of Edgar
Allan Poe’s story ‘The Purloined Letter’ (Anonymous, 1976). To briefly recapitulate
the story, an unnamed narrator discusses some of his most celebrated cases with a
detective by the name of Dupin. The Prefect of the Police then arrives and presents
a case that he would like to discuss with Dupin. A letter has been stolen from the
boudoir of an unnamed woman by the unscrupulous Minister D. It is said to contain
compromising information. The Prefect says that he and his detectives have
searched the Ministerial hotel where D. stayed, but could not find anything. Dupin,
however, did find the letter and consequently explains how: the police are compe-
tent within their limitations, but have underestimated with whom they are dealing.
The Prefect mistakes the Minister D. for a fool, because he is a poet. He explains
that D. knew that the police would assume that the blackmailer would conceal the
letter in an elaborate hiding place, and thus hid it in plain sight. As such, Dupin was
able to obtain the letter (Poe, 1845).
Applied to supervision, the analyst is the policeman, and having succumbed to
the illusion of mastery, he is blinded by his position in the discourse of the analy-
sant. The supervisor is detective Dupin, who sees that the thief is a poet and that the
letter should be found in relation to that subject’s fantasy. Within this format, super-
vision aims at making the analyst move from the place of the policeman to the place
of Dupin – that is, he should take the perspective of the supervisor. Accordingly,
supervision tries to guarantee that the analysant’s truth will not get ‘repressed’ or
substituted by the analyst’s interpretations and that the dimension of the divided
subject comes to the fore.
This approach allows us to understand Lacan’s (1976 [1975]) remark that we
should speak about ‘super-audition’ instead of ‘super-vision’. After all, it is a prac-
tice where an analyst tries to hear what a colleague-analyst did not hear during the
sessions with the analysant: the unconscious truth of the divided subject, which
tends to be repressed by the analyst’s sense-making activity. Thus, a Lacanian ana-
lyst looking for supervision is potentially in search of a subject-supposed-to-hear-
otherwise (Brousse, 2015).
Bruce Fink (2007) illustrates this process by referring to a therapist who didn’t
recognize a slip of the tongue one of her patients made, at least, not until she talked
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about it in supervision. The patient described himself as the kind of guy who is ‘in
short demand’ when he actually meant to say, ‘in short supply’. Initially the thera-
pist failed to hear the slip, but by recounting it in supervision it was heard. The
supervisor’s sensitivity to the symbolic articulation of the unconscious counters the
imaginary tendency to neglect unconscious truth by focusing on consistent patterns
of speech and taking the message the analysant wants to intentionally convey for
granted. Indeed, in daily practice the analyst tends to become caught up by the role
of being the (consistent) master that the analysant supposes him to play, forgetting
that this supposition was imposed due to transference. This might inhibit his ability
to address the unconscious. Brousse (2015) illustrates this with an analyst who was
constantly questioned by a paranoid patient about his knowledge and his practice.
Once realizing he had nothing to defend, a space was created for his patient to
complain.
Consequently, what takes shape in supervision is a shift from attempting to
understand to trying to hear. Lacan (1975 [1953–54]) recommended that those in
supervision should avoid understanding too much. Analysis doesn’t concern itself
with understanding and knowledge. In his Seminar on Anxiety (2004 [1962–63]), he
likewise characterized supervision as an action that gives way – like an illumination
– to that which lies beyond the established ideas that the analyst has formed about
his analysant.
It is a matter of hearing the ever-surprising symbolic dimension of speech beyond
what we presume to know already. When the analyst starts to get the idea of knowing
what the patient is going to say, it’s time to consult a supervisor (Kessler, 2012).
Supervision in ‘The Sinthome’
‘Becoming sensitive to the interrelation between language and jouissance’ Later in
his work, in his seminar XXIII (Lacan, 2005 [1975–76]), Lacan explicitly returns to
the question of supervision. At this point, his work no longer only starts from the
idea of ‘the unconscious structured as a language’ but also from the complex theo-
retical notion of lalangue, ‘Llanguage’ (Vanheule, 2011; Laurent, 2016). ‘Llan-
guage’ is a crucial concept in Lacan’s later teachings. It refers to the a-semantic side
of speech: to the tonality and musicality of speech qua expression of corporal drive-
related tension, and to the many possible equivoques (double meanings) in language
that echo similarities of sound rather than conceptual links between words. The con-
cept of ‘Llanguage’ indicates that while speech has a communicative function, it
also serves enjoyment, or ‘jouissance’ as Lacan would say (Dulsster, 2015). For
example, Lacan recognizes ‘Llanguage’ in the babbling of children who do not yet
speak, but enjoy producing sounds.
Interestingly, Lacan discussed his concept of ‘Llanguage’ in a dialogue with the
works of James Joyce, especially Finnegans Wake (Joyce, 2009 [1939]), which, in
his view, demonstrate very well what ‘Llanguage’ is. A nice example discussed by
Lacan (2005 [1975], p. 166) is the following phrase from Joyce: ‘Who ails tongue
coddeau a space of dumbillsilly?’ Written, it makes no sense at all (although we can
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discern some words), but spoken out loud, one can hear meaning. Phonologically,
these words echo the French sentence ‘où est ton cadeau, espèce d’imbécile?’
[‘where’s your gift, you complete idiot?’]. As we communicate, we impose the
structure of language on ‘Llanguage’ to create meaning. Hence, the structure of lan-
guage is only a fabrication, a surplus, which makes us believe that speech, which
primarily echoes corporeal tension and enjoyment, has a communicative function
(Miller, 2015 [2014]).
Indeed, in his later work Lacan no longer focuses solely on the dimension of
repressed desire arising in the reference between signifiers, but also on the embodied
side of speech. While at the time of ‘The function and field’ the symptom was just a
rebus that needs to be deciphered (a signifier referring to another signifier), his later
focus on ‘Llanguage’ also implies a focus on the nonsensical corporeal jouissance
that we all struggle with. In this view, the meaning of a symptom not only consti-
tutes symbolic knowledge that needs to be heard, but also makes up a circuit of
jouissance that a patient might well get addicted to. Therefore, when making inter-
ventions the analyst should not simply stimulate the production of meaning by ‘lis-
tening’ for meanings, but examine how the analysant deals with nonsensical
excitement, and switch to ‘reading the meaningless’ (Miller, 1996).
As such, next to careful listening to the play of signifiers, psychoanalysis con-
cerns reading ‘Llanguage’ as well (Miller, 2011). Such ‘knowing-how-to-read’ con-
sists in putting distance between speech and the meaning it carries. Accordingly, the
object of supervision will no longer only be the structure of language and meaning,
but also the tension between language and ‘Llanguage’ (Brousse, 2015).
An interesting example of how ‘Llanguage’ works can be found in a testimony
that Veronique Voruz (2016a) gave about her own analysis. Suffering from system-
atic eye inflammations, during her analysis she found herself saying ‘C’est mon his-
toire d’yeux!’ [‘It’s the hassle with my eyes’] (Voruz, 2016a, p. 99), at which point
the analyst exclaimed ‘Dieu [God], finally I hear it!’, emphasizing the equivocation
between d’yeux [eyes] and Dieu [God], and ended the session. Voruz indicates that
this surprising intervention relieved the symptom dramatically. For her, the expres-
sion ‘Dieu’ echoes her mother’s almost insane and furious religious faith. Being
called ‘the messenger of the Prince of Darkness’ by her mother, Voruz had experi-
enced the pressure of her mother’s hateful and insane gaze during her childhood.
This burdened her with a tension or jouissance that stuck to her. Her symptomatic
eye inflammations likely bore the trace of the insanity radiating from her mother.
During the analysis, unconscious determinations of the symptom had been explored,
but eye inflammation persisted. The both surprised and surprising intervention of
the analyst seems to have relieved the maternal jouissance etched onto her body.
‘Dieu’ is a cardinal expression from the mother’s discourse. It is an element bur-
dened with insane jouissance that, apart from its conventional meaning, began to
occupy a central role in the ‘Llanguage’ of Voruz, where it found expression in the
equivocal ‘Yeux’. Such a circuit of senseless jouissance cannot be tackled by focus-
ing on desire and truth, but by reading how ‘Llanguage’ has functioned, and carried
equivocal links between words.
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This shift has clear implications for psychoanalytic practice and as such on what
is at stake in supervision, as Lacan makes clear in his 23rd seminar (Lacan, 2005
[1975–76]).
The Stage of the Rhino In seminar 23, Lacan states: There is a stage when they
[the analysts] go like a rhino. They go barging in any old how, and I always go
along with them. Indeed, they are always right. The second stage consists in playing
on the equivoque that might free up something of the Sinthome. Indeed, the inter-
pretation operates solely through equivoques. There has to be something in the sig-
nifier that resonates (Lacan 2005 [1975–76], p. 9).
Lacan first discerns the ‘stage of the Rhino’, where he encourages the analysts to
follow their own ‘movement’ or inspiration.
One of the purposes of letting the Rhino rampage is to avoid imaginary identifica-
tion with the supervisor. As Silvestre (1975) states, there is always the curiosity of
the analyst concerning the Other analyst and, for this reason, the danger that the
analyst responds from the position of being ‘the example of how one should direct
his psychoanalytic practice’. If imitation is the product of supervision, the result
must be a lack of autonomy, and a mere ritualization of clinical practice (Szecsödy,
2008). More essentially, the analyst who, like a Rhino attacks blindly, is only
guided by his ears (Kessler, 2012): he just tends to unconscious truth and goes
against imaginary concerns that might inhibit the analytic process. The armoured
Rhino is the opposite of the divided analyst, fundamentally doubting and uncertain
(Laurent, 2016).
To substantiate what Lacan means by this stage of the Rhino, Jonckheere (2000)
refers to Philippe La Sagna (1999) who said that at the beginning of his supervision,
Lacan kept repeating: ‘you’re wonderful, it’s exactly like that!’ Everything he did as
an analyst was just ‘tremendous’, but, at one point, La Sagna had to assess that not
all the effects of his interventions were as tremendous as Lacan said. At one time,
he proclaimed to Lacan: ‘You said to me that it was exactly like that, but it can’t be
right’, to which Lacan replied, ‘Now that you say it yourself, I am relieved to see
you noticed it too’. For La Sagna, Lacan was playing on the pun that ‘tremendous’
also meant ‘terrifying’, and as such suggested that La Sagna’s interventions were
both formidable and terrifying at the same time. Like the rhino, every starting ana-
lyst ‘smells’ exactly where to go, but tends to proceed too boldly, with the blind
violence of the rhino.
It could be argued that acting like a Rhino, even an anxious one, is not a bad way
to enter clinical practice (Matet, 2015). The question is how to remain a bit of a
Rhino, while supplementing one’s interventions with a certain elegance (Biagi-Chai,
2015). By at first encouraging rhino-like behaviour, Lacan seems to counter ana-
lysts’ tendencies to practice in a rather passive way. Their so-called ‘analytic’
silence often betrays a fear of offering interpretations (Jonckheere, 2000). When the
analyst avoids this, the supervisor has a crucial role (Kessler, 2012). A supervisor
cannot formulate what an intervention should be, nor does he know the effect of the
said intervention. Something must, however, open up. As such, the purpose of
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supervision is to support the analytic intervention at a point where there is no man-
ual (Matet, 2015). Without a manual, the analyst must make sure his speech ‘cre-
ates’, and supervision should facilitate that. This is illustrated by Bonneau (2015)
who talks about how, at the beginning of her practice as a psychologist, the quest
for hidden meaning fascinated her. Yet she was confronted with the solitude of the
analytic practice and the effects of her speech on patients. Supervision allowed her
to discard her fascination with meaning, which was blinding her, and to tend to the
speech of her patients. She states that it was not her practice that was supervised,
but that supervision created the opportunity to intervene more precisely. This is why
Lacan disliked the term ‘control-analysis’, which continues to be used in France
with reference to supervision: supervision doesn’t have to ‘control’ anything, but
open the possibility for the supervisee to be creative. As such, being a rhino in the
realm of the symbolic is a necessary part of being an analyst, and has a liberating
impact relative to the habitual silence and inhibition of the analyst.
The Stage of the Pun However, supervision is not only about ‘letting the Rhino
have his way’. There is a second stage to supervision: it consists in playing on the
equivoque that might free up something of the sinthome. Indeed, the interpretation
operates solely through equivoques. There has to be something in the signifier that
resonates (Lacan, 2005 [1975–76], p. 9).
At this stage, the analyst should hear the ‘Llanguage’ that is present in the dis-
course of the analysant and learn how to play with equivocality and pun to operate
on the jouissance associated with the symptom. The analyst must oppose the pun of
the symptom with the pun of his interpretation (Jonckheere, 2000). Again, this fol-
lows Lacan’s viewpoint on analytic practice and the symptom, focusing on ‘know-
ing how to read’, and thus complementing the ‘saying it well’ or ‘full speech’ that
was present at the time of ‘The function and field’ (Miller, 2011).
What is at stake in this ‘second stage’ of supervision is illustrated well by Eric
Laurent (1992). As Jonckheere (2000) indicates, in a brief book chapter, Laurent
(1992) discusses the case of a man who was fantasizing about plastic surgery for his
nose, indicating that he talked about the case during supervision with Lacan. Laur-
ent tried to explain to Lacan that he was working very hard, like a rhino so to speak,
to put this patient off the idea of having his nose operated on. Lacan listened, but
also brought him to a standstill. To effectuate this standstill he made a paradoxical
intervention. While Lacan always recommended analysts refrain from checking
things in reality (see the case Ernst Kris discussed above), he asked Laurent if the
nose of the analysant is truly ugly. Somewhat stupefied, Laurent denied this, and
then Lacan drew attention to a pun echoing the analysant’s struggle: his desire for a
‘nouveau nez’ [a new nose] might express a desire for a new born child or ‘nouveau
né’ [new born] (Laurent, 1992).
For Lacan, this second stage of supervision challenges the surprising jouissance
that resonates in the analysant’s utterings, which cannot be explained rationally. As
stated by Solano-Suarez (2014, p. 2), moments of supervision with Lacan that
addressed this dimension were ‘flashing’ and ‘instantaneous’, no matter what case
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was presented. There was no room to elaborate complex ideas on a case, or to glide
into sophisticated meanings associated with a symptom. She never received any
remarks or suggestions – he let her proceed in her own rhino-like way – but he was
attentive to the dimension of ‘Llanguage’. His comments usually touched on the
speech of the analysant that she was discussing and echoed what was resonating lit-
erally in her expressions (the pun). According to Solano-Suarez (2014, p. 2), Lacan
aimed at ‘hearing in another way’, focusing on ‘what could be heard’ beyond mean-
ing, thus making ‘meaning’ explode until it became utter non-sense.
The testimony of Voruz addressed the same issue. Hearing people speak often
makes (Lacanian) psychoanalysts focus solely on the dimension of unconscious
truth only. This results in an exploration of subjective division, but might make the
analyst get stuck at the level of the symbolic, which can have an arresting effect:
the analyst gets caught in ‘the delusion of the symbolic’. Beyond this, signifiers
carry an inexplicable private jouissance, which can be heard, but not be explained.
The Hidden Stage: Incarnating the Object According to Jonckheere (2000) we
cannot limit ourselves to this distinction between language and ‘Llanguage’. There
is another side to this second stage of supervision, namely the question as to how
the analyst can incarnate the dimension of the object a. This object a is what, for
the subject, expresses the desire of the Other, beyond the dimension of the
symbolic.
In Voruz’s testimony about her personal analysis we see that she constantly
repeats that the intervention of her analyst ‘finally I hear it!’ was made with ‘a roar’
(Voruz, 2016a, p. 106; 2016b, p. 173). As such, her analyst incarnated the object
voice, an object that seemed very important throughout her history and her analysis.
After having focused on the signifier for many years (e.g. function and field),
and before starting to focus on jouissance in Llanguage, Lacan makes an impor-
tant shift in the early 1960s. Problems that were first approached with strict atten-
tion to the logic of the signifier are now addressed in terms of the limits of the
symbolic (Vanheule, 2011). Some aspects of Being cannot be grasped through lan-
guage, and the drive cannot be simply reduced to the symbolic. As such, he will
introduce the object a as what remains irreducible in the process of articulating the
subject by means of language. No matter how much signifiers are being produced,
some aspects will remain unarticulated. These unarticulated elements of the drive
will serve as a cause of desire for the subject. Lacan links the dimension of the
object a to specific registers of the drive, connected to specific erogenous zones.
As such, manifestations of the object a can be found in the oral, anal, scopic and
invocative register (i.e. in aspects of excess or lack that come to the fore in how
the Other receives, gives, looks and speaks). Neurosis implies the belief that mani-
festations of the object a in the Other expresses the Other’s desire (Lacan, 2004
[1962–63]), which is always linked to the corporal dimension (Vanhaute, 2000).
The object a is an element beyond linguistic representation, that gives ’flesh and
bones’ to sessions, in that it presents the analysant with the corporeal presence of
the analyst.
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As we can see in the following example, this dimension cannot be ignored in
transference: an analysant discussed a dream in which he held a box, secretly open-
ing it. Looking up, he sees the analyst looking at him, suddenly feeling caught and
feeling a lot of shame. In this dream, beyond the relevant signifiers, we see a repre-
sentation of the object gaze. This dimension of the gaze seemed to be neglected by
the analyst and at a certain point the analysant stopped the treatment, indicating: ‘if
I’m only here to talk, why would it be necessary to talk to you? I could also talk to
another analyst!’ For this analysant, the other’s gaze had a fuelling effect on his
desire, which his analyst seemed to neglect.
These examples highlight Lacan’s idea that the subject is not only an effect of
signifying articulation but is also determined by the object a, manifestations of
which are linked with specific registers of the drive. Beyond the focus on meaning
and the deciphering of the unconscious, and apart from its manifestation in Llan-
guage, the remainder of the drive also manifests bodily during social interaction or
in transference.
According to Jonckheere (2000), ‘incarnating the object’ was important for Lacan
in supervision. This might be discerned in the testimony of Jean-Claude Razavet
(1992). Razavet’s analysant was an obsessional man. On the one hand, he com-
plained of depressive spells, with the words: ‘I feel gloomy, I feel dark’. On the
other hand, he felt less dark when he decided to become a notary’s clerk. Remark-
ably, this analysant, with his obsessional complaint of feeling ‘dark’ was a black
man. However, not only was his symptom based on a pun, this was also true of his
auto-therapy, that is, his desire to become a clerk. Unfortunately, in English the sig-
nifier ‘clerk’ loses the double meaning of the original French signifier. In French,
the word clerk is homophonic with clair, meaning ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘bright’,
‘light’. Concerning his analysis, Razavet remarks that in the first period of his trans-
ference, this obsessional man behaved like a black slave towards his white master,
but little by little his exaggerated positive transference was disturbed by violent fan-
tasies of throwing his analyst out of the window of his office. Finally, these fanta-
sies became so overwhelming and so ‘realistic’ that Razavet became terror-stricken
and literally fled to Lacan for supervision on the case. Lacan’s advice: ‘but why
don’t you throw him out of the window?’ Razavet responded that it’s not a window,
that it’s a wardrobe with mirrors. ‘Well, then just buy yourself a knuckle-duster, or
don’t you know what that is?’ – and before Razavet could answer, Lacan extracts a
knuckle-duster from his pocket, holding it under the nose of the bewildered Razavet.
By this intervention of Lacan, Razavet is ‘mobilized’ and not rooted to his seat any
longer. The next time his analysant threatens to throw him out the window, at the
borderline of fantasy and reality, Razavet gets up, saying: ‘if you continue like that,
I will throw you out’. After this intervention, the aggression of the patient calmed
down. Razavet points out that with his manipulation of this very real object, the
knuckle-duster, Lacan stressed the dimension of semblant, of make-believe, the
appearances an analyst should keep up in the transference.
In this fragment of supervision, Lacan incarnated the remainder of the drive and
embodied the issue of symbolically delimited jouissance (Jonckheere, 2000).
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Analysts often expect that supervision will neutralize their presence in the analytic
process, but in fact their presence is crucial (Cauwe, Vanheule & Desmet, 2017).
They must be able to make ‘their body present’ by incarnating something of the
drive, being able to use their voice, their gaze, their silence …
However, the presence of his own body, and the attempt to incarnate the dimen-
sion of the drive for a specific analysant, can be a genuine problem for the analyst.
Here we could argue that besides the consistency of the imaginary and the delusion
of the symbolic, supervision concerns the real of the body, as a substance of jouis-
sance. It is evident that one considers the body of the patient and the symptoms that
are presented, but one must also consider the body of the analyst. When Lacan
(2011 [1971–72]) discusses the status of preliminary sessions, he stresses the pres-
ence of two bodies. The body is not only a body that sits on a chair all day, it is a
body that is part of the analytic discourse; it is an instrument, it incarnates a pres-
ence, a being-there. The analyst must ‘mount the stage’. The body of the analyst in
the analytic discourse is not just a lack, it is also incarnating the presence of this
object (Solano-Suarez, 2015). What operates in the analysis is not only of the order
of the representation of the signifier, it requires the ‘presentation’ of the object
a (Lacan, 2017 [1978], p. 8).
The body of the analyst must be present, but not burdened with affect and jouis-
sance. The idea of the object a qua restricted expression of jouissance makes this
clear. However, it is not uncommon that, when the analyst speaks about a certain
case, his body is strongly affected (Naveau, 2015). Sometimes the speech of the
analysant creates anxiety, pain and despair for the analyst, he enjoys or is affected
by shame or worries concerning his interventions or position, creating an inhibition,
rendering him a dead body. The analyst should be able to incarnate a presence,
sometimes very active, sometimes absent, sometimes discrete, depending on
the case.
According to Laurent (1992) this is the dimension of ‘knowing-how-to-act’
(‘savoir faire’) in clinical work. One should explore what kind of drive-related
object one is for the analysant, and actively work with this dimension. The analyst
should be present in the analytic work, but his actions should be emptied of private
jouissance. If the latter takes over, the analyst should be encouraged to start a per-
sonal analysis again.
DISCUSSION
Lacan opposed the concepts of ‘supervision’ and ‘contrôle’, but finally preferred the
neologism ‘super-audition’. Supervision is not about a senior analyst with superior
expertise who sets an example as to how one should practice. As stated in the intro-
duction, Lacanian supervision is not concerned with ‘gatekeeping’. Supervision
doesn’t ‘control’ anything, but opens the path towards inventive psychoanalytic
work. Letting the Rhino rage in the realm of the symbolic, the super-audition of
‘Llanguage’ and working with the position of the object are crucial components of
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Lacanian supervision. To effectively implement these obstacles at the level of the
imaginary, the symbolic and the real need to be challenged.
Starting from ‘The function and field’, a first target of Lacanian supervision con-
sists of tackling the consistency of the imaginary: the supervisor must counter the
imaginary tendency to neglect unconscious truth. At this point, it is a matter of hear-
ing the ever-surprising symbolic dimension of speech beyond what we presume to
know already. The supervised analyst should be able to take the place of the super-
visor, in the sense that it concerns a ‘second subjectivity’, not being blinded by the
consistency of the imaginary.
Second, Lacanian supervision focuses on taking into account the dimension of
Llanguage in speech and symptoms. Beyond the ‘rhino-like’ search for unconscious
truth, the analyst must listen to the jouissance resonating in the signifier. Conse-
quently, supervision goes against the ‘delusion of the symbolic’, that is, the idea that
speech is all about meaning, and makes the analyst see that language is a structure
imposed on ‘Llanguage’. Instead of imposing meaning, the analyst must work in the
opposite direction, using the equivoque as an answer to the symptom. The analyst
must learn how to read what the patient has written in the symptom.
Third, Lacanian supervision focuses on making the analyst incarnate the place of
the object a for an analysant. The analyst should be present in the analytic work,
but his actions should be emptied of private jouissance. The analyst is not only a
body that sits on a chair playing with words. It is a body that is part of the analytic
process; it is an instrument, it incarnates a presence, a being-there. The analyst must
‘mount the stage’. If inhibition or jouissance take over, the analyst should be
encouraged to start a personal analysis again.
All aforementioned obstacles blind the analyst, making him close his eyes and
fall asleep in common sense thinking. Supervision counters this tendency, and is
about being vividly present in clinical work. Indeed, therefore the Lacanian ana-
lyst should visit a supervisor: it helps him/her to stay awake and stay attuned to
the analysant.
Considering supervision from a Lacanian perspective has some clear implications.
First, by not focusing on gatekeeping, and by ‘letting the Rhino rage’, the practice
of Lacanian supervision might help avoid some common pitfalls encountered in psy-
chotherapy supervision. Considering supervision as a gatekeeping practice might
inhibit the supervisee from speaking truthfully about cases (Grinberg, 1997). As
Thomas (2014) indicated, the inequality and the power in the relation can render the
supervisee vulnerable and dependent. By disconnecting supervision from institution-
alized purposes, Lacanian supervision somewhat solves this and gives the supervi-
see freedom to choose a supervisor, which adds the dimension of transference to
supervision. This enables the supervisee to leave a supervisor without consequence.
This is very important as Moskowitz and Rupert (1983) indicate that 40% of stu-
dents in training experience conflict during their supervision. Gray et al. (2001)
observe that students often say that supervisors do not respond empathically or
ignore or even reject events brought forward by the supervisee. Sometimes they
have to change the treatment without further explanation.
© 2019 BPF and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
British Journal of Psychotherapy 35, 1 (2019) 54–70
On Lacan and Supervision 65
Second, although there is no one model or style of supervision that could be used
by all practitioners in all settings and at all times in their career (Fleming & Steen,
2004b), it might be useful to differentiate between (non-chronological) stages in the
practitioner’s working life. A Lacanian supervisor, for example, might start from the
difference between the stages of ‘the rhino’, ‘the pun’ and ‘the object’. These stages
might make sense for other therapeutic approaches as well. For example, we can
link the so-called ‘stage of the rhino’ to Szecsödy’s (2008) remark that, not surpris-
ingly, supervisees respond to a climate of trust, understanding and acceptance when
making themselves vulnerable by presenting their therapeutic work. Excessive criti-
cism can be humiliating and injurious to analytic and psychotherapeutic develop-
ment and learning (Blum, 2007 in Rubinstein, 2007; Gray et al., 2001). If the
supervisor does not let the rhino rampage a bit, inhibition could arise from the hor-
ror of control by the paternal eye watching over them (De Bell, 1963). As stated by
Wheeler (2004), supervisees in training look to the supervisor to provide them with
support, guidance and encouragement. However, anxiety about exposing potential
mistakes to an authority figure is ever present. We believe that our three Lacanian
stages of supervision can help provide optimal conditions for a practitioner to inte-
grate experiences, theoretical knowledge, and personal style in developing their
competence in handling the psychoanalytic process, as well as receiving proper
supervision for psychotherapy.
All of this raises further questions, however. First, discussing countertransference
in supervision seems to be one of the most controversial aspects of supervision
(De Bell, 1963; Lebovici, 1970; Eizirik & Zaslavsky, 1989; Rubinstein, 1992;
Grinberg, 1995, 1997; Zaslavsky, 1999; Zaslavsky, Nunes & Eizirik, 2005). For
Freud (2006 [1910]) it was necessary for the analyst to recognize and overcome
countertransference in order to work effectively with patients. Identifying, contain-
ing and understanding countertransference can do much to improve the quality of
psychological care given in mental health settings (Wallerstein, 2001). Supervisors
often differ in terms of the attitude one should adopt with the countertransference of
the supervisee towards his patient (Grinberg, 1997). Lacan, by contrast, was critical
of theories concerning countertransference and aimed at integrating such issues into
discussions of transference. As such, it would therefore be interesting to study how
the dimension of countertransference is handled in the Lacanian approach of
supervision.
Second is the question of diagnostics and intervention. Lacan, as he ‘lets the rhino
rage’, doesn’t seem to discuss the diagnoses and interventions that his supervisees
present. Nor does he seem to let his supervisees elaborate cases in detail. It would
be worthwhile to explore conceptual and clinical rationales behind this approach,
and to systematically map how it took shape in Lacan’s practice.
Lastly, how do these theoretical ideas translate into the day-to-day practice of
supervision? We considered Lacanian supervision from a theoretical perspective and
mostly used clinical examples of analysts in supervision with Lacan. This doesn’t
fully grasp Lacan’s practice as a supervisor. To get better insight, a systematic study
of testimonies on supervision with Lacan might be worthwhile (e.g. Geblesco,
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2008). To further elaborate our ideas on the three stages of supervision, it would be
interesting to examine how these appeared in Lacan’s work as a supervisor, and
how they appear nowadays in the practice of supervision.
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NOTE
1. In line with Lacan, we write analysant with a ‘t’ and not with a ‘d’. The term ‘analysand’
denotes a passive position; it is the word used to refer to a person who undergoes analysis.
‘Analysant’ points to an active position. It is the active form of the French verb ‘analyser’
(to analyse) (Dulsster et al., 2018, p. 6). Lacan prefers the expression analysant because of
the active role it gives to the one who decides to engage in psychoanalysis (Lacan,
2017 [1971]).
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